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A recent article [Vinkovic D, Kirman A (2006) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
103:19261–19265] showing that the Schelling model has a physical
analogue extends our understanding of the model. However, prior
research has already outlined a mathematical basis for the Schell-
ing model and simulations based on it have already enhanced our
understanding of the social dynamics that underlie the model,
something that the physical analogue does not address. Research
in social science has provided a formal basis for the segregative
outcomes resulting from the residential selection process and
simulations have replicated relevant spatial outcomes under dif-
ferent specifications of the residential dynamics. New and increas-
ingly detailed survey data on preferences demonstrates the em-
beddedness of the Schelling selection process in the social
behaviors of choosing alternative residential compositions. It also
demonstrates that, in the multicultural context, seemingly mild
preferences for living with similar neighbors carry the potential to
be strong determinants for own race selectivity and residential
segregation.
preferences  simulation  ethnicity  integration  neighborhoods
A recent article outlined a model that can explain the way inwhich separation or segregation (clustering) can arise in
physical processes and is thus a parallel to the clustering out-
comes of the Schelling segregation model (1). The physical
analogue is interesting and it is intriguing to learn that there are
physical parallels to social processes with specific commonalities
in the physical processes of clustering and the social process of
residential separation and segregation. That said, it is not
completely clear that we have advanced our understanding of
segregation and segregation dynamics by generating a physical
analogue to the Schelling model. Although the physical analogue
explains clustering and separating, the most important issue in
the Schelling model, from a social perspective, is how choices
play out in the social fabric and lead to segregated residential
patterns. We show here that there are well articulated mathe-
matical explanations for social segregation, that simulation
studies with relatively simple utility structures can replicate
complex and sometimes subtle segregation patterns seen in real
urban environments, and that data from surveys of preferences
reiterate the role of social distance in segregation outcomes.
The original Schelling agent model was disarmingly simple
in its construction (2, 3). It posited that an agent, a model
representation of a household that could be white or black,
preferred to be on a square on a checkerboard in which half
or more of the eight adjacent neighbors were of a similar color.
In the economic context, this was seen as having utility one
compared with having utility zero. Schelling used simple
simulations based on such hypothetical preference schedules
to show that the adjustments of individual households respond-
ing to changes in composition on the checkerboard invariably
lead to complete segregation (3). New survey evidence for
different groups makes it possible to base preference schedules
for simulation studies on empirical findings instead of using
hypothetical schedules as Schelling did (4). As we review
below, preference schedules based on surveys indicate that
households do typically favor residing with households of
similar color.
The Schelling model was of mostly theoretical interest and was
rarely cited (5) until a significant debate about the extent and
explanations of residential segregation in U.S. urban areas was
engaged in the 1980s and 1990s (6, 7). To that point, most social
scientists offered an explanation for segregation that invoked
housing discrimination, principally by whites, as the major force in
explaining why there was residential separation in the urban fabric
(8). Reevaluation of the explanations for residential separation
suggested that individual preferences alone, and in combination
with economic differences among ethnic groups, could play an
important role in explaining patterns of residential separation (9).
The Schelling model was critical in providing a theoretical basis for
viewing residential preferences as relevant to understanding the
ethnic patterns observed in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, its
implications have been buttressed by accumulated findings on
preferences inmulticultural settings which show that allmajor racial
and ethnic groups hold preferences that are as strong as or stronger
than the relatively mild preferences Schelling considered in his
original two-group formulation.
The underlying basis of residential preferences is a matter of
ongoing debate and a full review of the issues is beyond the scope
of this study. In brief, preferences have complex origins and
emerge from the social psychology, group dynamics, and history
of racial and ethnic relations. Many plausible views have been
offered. For example, it has been suggested that preferences
reflect attachments to group identity and group culture (e.g.,
language, religion, beliefs, norms, customs, music, art, etc.)
formed in early socialization, the salience of ethnicity in personal
identity and sense of social position, and ethnocentric evalua-
tions wherein individuals favor their own group’s culture over
other group cultures. It also has been suggested that preferences
are shaped by expectations and stereotypes, founded or un-
founded, that coethnics will provide reciprocal acceptance and
support; that other groups may be indifferent, unwelcoming, or
overtly hostile; that residing in ethnic neighborhoods may be
convenient and carry practical benefits; and that neighborhood
ethnic mix is predictive of future neighborhood conditions and
home values.
None of these possibilities is implausible and none are mutu-
ally exclusive of others, so all can be entertained simultaneously.
Significantly, however, the basis of residential preferences is not
crucial to assessing their implications for segregation. This is
clear in mathematical formulations and computer simulation
models. In such contexts, particular preferences for coethnic
contact produce identical residential choices and patterns of resi-
dential segregation regardless of the presumed basis of the prefer-
ence. Thus, from any point of view, groups’ patterns of evaluating
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the presence of households similar to and different from them-
selves may be relevant to understanding the outcomes of
residential selection.
The more important distinction in the literature is the distinction
between preferences and discrimination. Two key points are espe-
cially relevant. First, scholarly research and fair housing legislation
maintain logical and legal distinctions between voluntary residen-
tial choices guided by preferences and involuntary constraints on
housing choices resulting from housing discrimination, intimida-
tion, and violence. Second, policy options for promoting integration
differ dramatically for these two factors. Discrimination is prohib-
ited by law and is subject to a variety of legal remedies. Preferences
are outside the purview of fair housing law and remedies, if sought,
will necessarily be fundamentally different. In view of this, it is
crucial to gain a better understanding of the impact preferencesmay
have on segregation.
Mathematical Derivations and Agent-Based Models
Schelling’s analyses of the implications of preference schedules
suggested that mixed-race residential neighborhoods are not likely
to be stable. Young (10) provides rigorous theoretical analyses
supporting and extending Schelling’s insights. Similarly, Zhang (11,
12) also has shownmathematically that segregationwill result under
the Schelling model, even when everyone desires integration.
Specifically, he shows that segregation is a stochastically stable state
‘‘that tends to emerge and persist in the long run regardless of the
initial state’’ (12, p 548). The finding that separation will occur even
when most people prefer integrated neighborhoods is important
because it may help us explain the persistence of separation even in
a world that is increasingly tolerant and where society has made
significant strides toward reducing discrimination in the housing
market. ‘‘Without any discriminatory behavior in the housing
market a slight preference for like-color neighbors . . . can give rise
to a high level of residential segregation and cause it to persist’’ (11,
p 164).
Formal analysis indicates that even asymmetric preferences
for same-group contact can be sufficient to create segregated
patterns under the Schelling model. Zhang established this for
the two-color case with a preference for own color by one group
and neutral preferences by the other group by drawing on the
theory of stochastic dynamical systems and the method of agent
modeling. Building on work in evolutionary game theory, he
showed that even slight asymmetry in residential preferences
between two groups will produce endogenous segregation. The
basic model considers a set of n neighbors, either four in the
rook’s case, or eight in the queen’s case, on a checkerboard
lattice. Each of the locations may have a black agent or a white
agent, or may be vacant. Price of housing is introduced, but not
housing quality (all units are assumed to be of the same quality)
and a market mechanism determines the price of housing. In the
‘‘housing market’’ (the locations of the lattice checkerboard), a
‘‘natural vacancy rate’’ facilitates housing market turnover.
There is no restriction on the agent choices, but white agents
prefer to live near whites whereas black agents are neutral with
respect to their choices. In each period, a pair of locations is
chosen randomly and a set of possible outcomes includes a black
agent moving to a vacant location, a white agent moving to a
vacant location, a black agent exchanging locations with a white
agent, a black agent with a black agent, and a white agent with
a white agent. The agents make choices based on their individual
utilities but decisions are boundedly rational and agents may
make utility-decreasing moves.
Under the conditions outlined earlier, Zhang shows that S, the set
of all states that maximizes the sum of all agents’ utilities, is
stochastically stable. Significantly, if blacks are color neutral, and
whites have a slight preference for like-colored neighbors (say a
least a 60–70% preference), the results are intriguing: residential
segregation emerges, vacancy rates are higher in areas with black
concentrations, andwhites paymore for housing. The results Zhang
obtains by using a game-theoretic framework are powerful; they
move the Schelling model from a set of general statements and an
inductive approach to neighborhood selection to a ‘‘precisely de-
fined mathematical concept’’ (11, p 164) where neighborhood
transitions are determined by a set of utility functions. Young (10)
similarly provides rigorous formal foundations for Schelling’s most
basic insights.
Preferences, Tolerance, and the Basis of Simulation Models
There has been a long history of simulating the Schelling model.
Early models were spare and simple, but advances in computing
capabilities make it more feasible than ever to use simulation
approaches to explore how residential outcomes vary over a wide
range of increasingly complex and realistic model inputs (13, 14).
For example, a recent model incorporates the role of multiple
types of preferences, multiple ethnic groups, urban and demo-
graphic conditions, and intergroup inequality in socioeconomic
status (15). Models of this sort expand our ability to investigate
the residential patterns that emerge when agent choices are
guided by different preference distributions, including both
hypothetical distributions and ones fashioned after results from
survey studies.
A core feature of agent models is the use of game-theoretic
contexts with feedback loops. In the standard two-group simu-
lation, agents may be open to living in mixed neighborhoods and
seek only to avoid being in the minority (i.e., less than half the
population). However, their moves to satisfy this objective—that
is, moving from an area where their group is in the minority to
one where it is at least half—change the ethnic mix in both
locations in a way that precipitates further movement. The
neighborhood they leave becomes less attractive to members of
their group and the neighborhood they enter becomes less
attractive to members of the other group. Over successive
iterations, homogeneous neighborhoods emerge.
The limitations of nonexperimental research make it difficult
to evaluate the effects of different factors on segregation in real
cities. Consequently, there has been a contentious debate be-
tween those who focus on the role of social distance and
preferences as potential explanatory forces in creating separa-
tion, and those who invoke the effects of housing discrimination.
Because neither group can establish empirically grounded eval-
uations of the effects of either preferences or discrimination,
recent work has focused on the logical standing of explanations
based on social distance asking, ‘‘Is it reasonable to entertain the
hypothesis that social distance and preference dynamics could
generate and sustain significant levels of segregation in the
absence of discrimination’’ (15). The mathematical formulations
we reviewed earlier suggest that segregation can arise from
simple preferences for own-race neighbors. Below we show that
simulations based on observed ethnic preferences also provide
quantitative and qualitative (visual) evidence for this possible
residential dynamic.
An extensive literature exists on preferences and their implica-
tions for residential separation. An early study of Detroit used
survey flash cards depicting different racial residential neighbor-
hood combinations to establish that blacks generally preferred
neighborhoods that were half black and half white, but whites
generally preferred neighborhoods that were nearly all white (16).
Subsequent studies of other metropolitan areas replicated this
finding (17, 18) and also documented similar patterns in the
preferences of other racial and ethnic groups (9). Focusing on
white–black differences, the finding that most white households
want majority white neighborhoods, whereas most African Amer-
ican households prefer neighborhoods that are at least half black—
with a 50/50 black–white compositionmost preferred— is central to
arguments that preferences may contribute to group residential
separation in cities. Two lines of reasoning support this conclusion.
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The first and most obvious is that the modal preferences for whites
and blacks are not compatible—most African American house-
holds want a neighborhood that is at least 50%black, but fewwhites
prefer such neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with a 50/50 ethnic mix
are thus inherently unstable. Blacks arewilling to enter and stay, but
whites will not enter or stay. This provides insight into the role of
preferences in the dynamics of residential ‘‘tipping’’; the often
observed outcome where neighborhoods that become 20–30%
minority often continue on to become majority minority (19).
Recent studies have contributed to our understanding of how other
race avoidance impacts the likelihood of particular neighborhood
selection (20) and patterns of neighborhood change (21).
There is a less obvious basis for linking preferences to
segregation that has been termed ‘‘the paradox of weak minority
preferences’’ (15). Setting whites’ preferences aside completely,
minority preferences for 50/50 neighborhoods are rarely com-
patible with integration. Citywide integration obtains when all
neighborhoods match the ethnic mix of the city. But few
metropolitan areas have ethnic mixes that correspond to minor-
ity preferences for neighborhood ethnic mix. So the thought
experiment of arranging neighborhoods to match blacks’ resi-
dential preferences for 50/50 racial mix does not lead to low
segregation scores. To the contrary, for most metropolitan areas,
the exercise produces substantial segregation (15).
The Metropolitan Study of Urban Inequality provides rich
data on group preferences for neighborhood composition.
Here, we review data on ‘‘ideal’’ neighborhood ethnic com-
position. Respondents were asked to populate an ‘‘ideal’’
neighborhood—a 3  5 grid of housing units centered on the
respondent’s home—with households from four ethnic groups
(whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians). The answers register
preferences for same-group neighbors and also preferences
regarding neighbors from other groups. The data we review
are for the four race/ethnic groups in Los Angeles, a harbinger
of America’s increasingly multicultural metropolitan areas.
Fig. 1 summarizes the ethnic distributions that respondents
from the four groups gave for the eight housing units surround-
ing to the respondent’s home. These results for adjacent neigh-
bors indicate that all groups prefer a majority or near-majority
of their surrounding neighbors in an ideal neighborhood to be of
the same race/ethnicity although with varying mixes of other
groups. Significantly, the ethnic distributions for the eight ad-
jacent locations are fundamentally similar. This indicates that it
is appropriate to compare groups in terms of their overall
preference pattern. Doing so leads straightaway to an obvious
but powerful conclusion: none of groups has a preference
distribution that is compatible with that of any other group.
The diagram provides insight into how preferences may
promote separation in the residential mosaic. Regarding pref-
erences for same-race neighbors, the ideal neighborhood results
are consistent with previous findings that all groups prefer areas
where their group is a majority or near-majority. The range of
variation is modest; a bit50% in the case of African Americans
and50% in the case of Asians. Regarding preferences for other
groups, there are notable differences between responses for
blacks and whites compared with responses for Hispanics and
Asians. In general, blacks and whites express relative neutrality
regarding the composition of other-group neighbors. In contrast,
Asians indicate a clear preference for whites over blacks and
Hispanics and, similarly, Hispanics prefer whites over blacks and
Asians. These details reinforce the basic conclusion that no two
groups seek neighborhoods with similar ethnic composition.
Fig. 2 presents the data on ideal ethnic mix of neighbors from
another perspective. It gives each group’s distribution of re-
sponses regarding the preferred number of same-group house-
holds for the eight adjacent housing units surrounding the
respondent’s home. The possible counts range from 0 to 8. The
diagrams depict possible spatial structures for each count vary-
ing from own-group dominance to own-group minority status.
These are illustrative; individual responses did not necessarily
correspond to the exact spatial structures depicted. The figure
shows that most respondents chose middle-range outcomes on
same-group presence. There are few choices for either isolation
or complete dominance. The most common response sets for
ideal neighborhoods are in the range of majority or near-
majority same-group presence. Blacks show the greatest open-
ness to minority status within a neighborhood. Even so, 60% of
blacks express a preference for near half (i.e., 3 of 8) or greater
same-group presence. The figures for Hispanics, whites, and
Asians are higher at 66%, 72%, and 75%, respectively. Because
no group expresses a preference for minority status, no conceiv-
able neighborhood ethnic mix can satisfy the preferences of all
groups.
Simulations
Segregation simulations implement simplified behavioral rules
within a specified urban structure and examine the resulting
residential outcomes to gain insights into how social dynamics
may shape the realities that we observe in cities (15, 22).
According to the conventions of agent modeling, agents are
Fig. 1. Race and ethnic choices for ideal neighborhood cell composition.
Fig. 2. Own-race preferences in an ideal neighborhood composition.
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‘‘virtual households with the ability to search in virtual housing
markets’’ and make residential choices. Households have pref-
erences for coethnic contact specified as the percentage pres-
ence of coethnic households in the neighborhood the household
lives in or is considering moving to. The SimSeg model we use
runs in a fashion similar to all agent models, but with greater
capabilities than most previous simulations of residential dy-
namics. The model’s key features and algorithms are described
in detail elsewhere (15). In brief, it creates housing units of
varying quality and places them at residential locations across the
city. It then populates this virtual city with households of
different ethnic and socioeconomic status (income) and distrib-
utes them randomly to housing units. Ethnic segregation in the
city thus initially reflects only random departure from even
distribution. During the simulations households move according
to the rules of the model by making residential choices guided by
three separate and independent preference concerns: goals for
housing quality, goals for neighborhood income, and goals for
neighborhood ethnic composition. The program calculates seg-
regation scores over the course of the simulation so trends in
segregation can be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively
based on graphical representations of the city’s residential
distributions.
We present results from simulation experiments crafted to
explore the implications of ethnic preferences in multigroup
situations similar to those discussed previously. For simplicity,
we consider a situation with three groups—blue, red, and
green—and even demographic proportions (34%, 33%, and
33%, respectively).d,e Households are assigned ethnic prefer-
ences; that is, targets for same-group presence in neighbor-
hoods.f We vary these in magnitude in different simulations to
bracket the range of preferences reported in surveys. In addition,
all households in all groups are assigned preferences for high-
quality housing (relative to what they can afford) and prefer-
ences to reside in areas with high-average income. Households
give identical weight to all three preferences, so goals regarding
area ethnic composition are just one among several important
goals shaping the location decisions households make.
Households ‘‘see’’ neighborhoods based on diamond-shaped
local areas consisting of the 40 housing units within four cardinal
moves of a focal housing unit.g Households evaluate neighbor-
hood ethnic composition and average income based on the
population residing in the local area. As in real urban areas, the
city is given a significant city–suburb gradient on housing quality
with low-income housing being concentrated in the center. In
addition, the city has a high-income group (blues) and two
low-income groups (reds and greens) whose average income is
30% below the average for the high-income group. The city–
suburb housing gradient creates pronounced segregation along
socioeconomic lines, but its impact on ethnic segregation is
modest. At initialization, the two low-income ethnic groups are
more centralized, but their overall segregation from the high-
income ethnic group is not great (15).
We present representative examples of simulation results in
Fig. 3.h Each row corresponds to a single simulation experiment
and contains a sequence of images depicting the city’s residential
distribution at four points in the experiment. Ethnic segregation
is seen visually when households of different colors (i.e., blue,
red, and green) cluster together on the city landscape. In
addition, a quantitative segregation index—the variance ratio
(V)—is computed for each of the three possible two-group
comparisons.i The scores are plotted in the graph on the
right-hand side of the figure. Socioeconomic segregation is seen
visually based on high-income households being depicted in
darker shades and low-income households in lighter shades.
Accordingly, the central areas are lighter and the outlying areas
are darker. Socioeconomic segregation is not our main focus, so
we have omitted quantitative results to save space.
The key feature of the simulations is that we vary in-group
preference targets assigned to households from levels substan-
tially below those documented in surveys (e.g., 20%) to levels
similar to those documented in surveys (e.g., 40–60%) and
beyond.j Several important patterns are evident in the results.
One is that ethnic segregation is low at the beginning of every
simulation; not surprising because it primarily reflects random
departure from even distribution. Another is that ethnic segre-
gation emerges quickly and stabilizes at high levels when pref-
erences for same-group contact are similar to those documented
in surveys. The crucial transition occurs when preference targets
reach or exceed a group’s population representation (22). Thus,
high levels of segregation emerge when targets for same-group
contact shift from 20% to 40%. Segregation is low when
households seek 20% same-group contact because all house-
holds can be satisfied in neighborhoods that match the city’s
ethnic mix. This is not the case when all households seek 40%
same-group contact; accordingly, high levels of segregation
emerge. Perhaps surprising to some, raising targets for same-
dSimSeg can implement two- and three-group simulations. The shift from two to three
groups is sufficient to reveal many differences in the implications of preferences in the
multigroup context.
eThis is a conservative setting because specifying groups as equal in size is optimal for
maintaining integration in Schelling-style segregation models (22). Higher levels of seg-
regation resultwhenweusemore realistic demographic distributions (e.g., 65, 25, and10).
fTargets for same-group presence are the same for all groups.We ran simulations in which
preference targets were dispersed around the mean (as seen in the distributions in Fig. 2)
and simulations in which targets were homogeneous. The results were similar either way,
indicating that, in themain, preference effects revolve around the central tendency of the
preference distribution.
gThis specification is used in recent studies (22, 23) and is similar to the 5  5 square
neighborhoods Schellingused in some simulations (2). Significantly, preferenceeffects are
robust over varying specifications of neighborhood size, shape, and type (e.g., bounded
areas versus site-centered areas).
hThe results shown here are from representative simulation experiments. We performed
500 replications for each design to establish the statistical norm for quantitative results.
iV is a well known measure with many attractive technical properties. We also computed
scores for themorewidely useddissimilarity index (D). ReportingV is a conservative choice;
scores for D are always higher and suggest even more dramatic segregation results.
jWe omit results for simulations with preferences set to zero. Not surprisingly, segregation
did not emerge in these simulations.
Fig. 3. Animation sequences and segregation trends by targets for coethnic
contact.
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group contact to even higher levels has minimal additional
impact on the overall level of segregation or the speed with which
it emerges. This is anticipated by previous studies (2, 10, 11, 12,
22) that note that, once certain critical thresholds are crossed,
preferences tend to drive local areas toward homogeneity.
Space does not permit a full discussion of how Schelling-style
segregation effects vary with agent vision. But we offer a few
comments to place the results just reviewed in perspective. Agent
vision (i.e., the local area the agent ‘‘sees’’) can be specified as
narrow (e.g., rook’s and queen’s neighborhoods), expansive (e.g.,
subdivisions, school districts, etc.), or intermediate in size (e.g.,
census blocks and block groups). Similarly, vision can be spec-
ified in terms of either bounded areas or local areas. Prior
research shows that the form of segregation will vary with vision.
When agent vision is narrow, segregation will emerge first at
small spatial scales and build to larger scales only over long
periods of time. When agent vision is intermediate or expansive,
segregation will emerge straightaway at larger spatial scales.
When agent vision follows bounded areas, segregation will
follow area boundaries and can produce ‘‘checkering’’ if agents
evaluate individual areas in isolation. If agent vision is local,
ethnically homogeneous regions will have irregular shapes.
In the simulations we report here, we specified agent vision at
an intermediate spatial scale (i.e., 40 housing units) approxi-
mately comparable in size to census blocks. As the graphical
images show, this vision specification produces visually obvious
clustering. Our specification of agent vision is consistent with
research on residential choice, which indicates that households
consider more than just adjacent housing units when making
residential decisions. The vision specification we use is smaller
than some relevant alternatives (e.g., large areas similar to school
districts), but readily produces clustering patterns characteristic
of urban areas without imposing undue computational burdens.k
It is plausible that households might respond to multiple neigh-
borhood definitions simultaneously (e.g., adjacent neighbors,
city blocks, school districts, etc.). SimSeg can implement such
possibilities, and studies exercising this capability indicate that
the findings reported here hold so long as one of the area
specifications involves intermediate or higher vision (24).
Bearing the simplifications of simulation analysis in mind, the
graphical images of city residential distributions shown here are
surprisingly consistent with contemporary urban residential
patterns. In cases where ethnic preferences approximate survey
results, city landscapes depict high levels of segregation by both
socioeconomic status and ethnicity. Higher-income households
from all groups are on the periphery of the urban structure and
are spatially distant from lower-income households in the center.
Likewise, whether in the lower-income center or the higher-
income periphery, ethnic groups live apart from each other. This
is comparable to patterns of residential formation that we see in
our cities today. Thus, the simulations reveal that reasonable
representations of the ongoing location decisions of households
can create complex patterns of residential segregation. The
visual outcomes and quantitative results constitute powerful
evidence that social distance and preference dynamics do have
the logical capacity to combine with socioeconomic inequality
between groups to create relatively high levels of ethnic and class
segregation. It is intriguing to note that the simulation results
produce some subtle patterns often seen in real cities. Specifi-
cally, whereas the spatial separation of high-income and low-
income households is great, socioeconomic differences between
ethnic groups shape ethnic segregation in only limited ways.
Group differences in socioeconomic standing have little impact
on the segregation dimension of uneven distribution (which V
measures), but minority socioeconomic disadvantage does serve
to concentrate minority populations in high-poverty areas in the
central city (15). In terms of potential social implications, it is
obvious that this would foster disproportionate minority expo-
sure to crime and other social problems found in high-poverty
areas.
Significantly, the simulations here move beyond the Schelling
two-color model to explore patterns of segregation in multiple
group settings. In the increasing complexity of our metropolitan
areas it is clearly important to analyze the dynamics of more than
two groups. The most powerful finding from this is that there is
little evidence of extensive integration among any combination
of ethnic groups resulting from residential choices guided by
ethnic preferences. As in real cities, minorities are segregated
not only from the majority group, but also from each other. This
pattern is not predicted by theories of housing discrimination by
whites.
The data in Fig. 2 indicated that a nontrivial fraction of
individuals in all groups say they would prefer neighborhoods
where their group is not in the clear minority. Why don’t the
residential choices of these individuals promote more integrated
outcomes? Formal analysis of the implications of preference-
guided choices and agent simulations highlight the reason why;
spatial outcomes are not determined by just the choices of one
group, or the choices of the most tolerant members within a
particular group. The dynamic nature of the residential sorting
process drives the residential pattern toward nonminority status
for all households and groups. When a household enters a
neighborhood, the neighborhood becomes more attractive to
members of the household’s own group and less attractive to
members of other groups. Unless most households are strongly
averse to majority status—and surveys indicate this is not the
case, local neighborhoods will drift toward ethnic homogeneity.
The resulting neighborhood structure is more segregated than
most individual households would find ‘‘ideal.’’
These results indicate that the potential relevance of ethnic
preferences for segregation cannot easily be discounted. Some
have suggested that prevailing ethnic preferences would permit
substantial integration if other segregation-promoting dynamics
(e.g., housing discrimination) were eliminated. This hypothesis is
contradicted by formal theory and by simulation results such as
we have presented here. Of course, although our attention here
is narrowly focused on preference effects, we do not gainsay the
fact that other important social dynamics also are present in
urban life and exert independent effects on segregation (25). At
the same time, we must stress that acknowledging the relevance
of other factors does not undermine the conclusions we offer
regarding preference effects. It is a mistake to suggest, as some
have, that preference effects can be relevant only when other
factors are irrelevant. To the contrary, none of the factors
segregation theorists consider as relevant are mutually exclusive
of each other. So it is highly plausible that segregation is
produced by multiple factors operating in combination.
In the context where multiple factors may be impacting
aggregate spatial patterns, it is difficult to definitively assess the
impact of any single dynamic, especially by using nonexperimen-
tal data.l Simulation and agent modeling present a useful option
for investigating segregation dynamics in this situation. They
provide a means for exploring the possible outcomes of complex
social processes and they can illuminate how complex macro
kThe shift fromsmall-to-large scale segregationpatternsoccurs at low levels of agent vision
(e.g., 4–16 units). Computational burden increases geometrically as local agent vision
increases. Intermediate vision produces large-scale segregation with low computational
burden.
lWhen multiple factors affect segregation, quantitative assessments of their separate
effects depend critically on how the analysis is performed. When each is ‘‘added’’ or
‘‘removed’’ from a model system in which no other segregation dynamics are active, the
impact can be large. However, when they are ‘‘added’’ or ‘‘removed’’ from amodel system
in which multiple segregation dynamics are active, their impact is usually small.
Clark and Fossett PNAS  March 18, 2008  vol. 105  no. 11  4113
SO
CI
A
L
SC
IE
N
CE
S
outcomes may arise from simple microbehavioral dynamics. The
social sciences have been slow to embrace these tools, but their
potential value is becoming increasingly apparent. As the liter-
ature advances, agent models have great potential to help us to
better understand the real-world dynamics of the city. Already,
they have provided a basis for arguing that preferences, social
distance dynamics, and residential choices cannot be dismissed
as possible explanations of segregation outcomes. As the models
continue to be refined, they may inform the debate about
alternate explanations for segregation in the urban landscape
even further.
Observations and Conclusions
Our article shows that there is now a rigorous mathematical basis
for the Schelling model and increasingly refined methods for
simulating the impact of preferences and social distance dynam-
ics. The results establish clearly that to ignore the role of choice
behavior based on own-race preferences is to ignore a potentially
important influence of racial and ethnic dynamics in the resi-
dential fabric. Of course, much work remains to be done to assess
how segregation dynamics may change in an increasingly mul-
tiethnic society. For example, as the number of mixed race/ethnic
individuals continues to increase, segregation patterns will be
further complicated by their residential selections. Preliminary
evidence suggests that mixed-race households are more likely to
live in integrated neighborhoods than in homogeneous concen-
trations of either of their parental races or ethnicities.
Intra- and intergroup inequality in socioeconomic status both
continue at high levels, racial and ethnic status continue to have
high salience in social relations, and survey evidence shows that
people generally strive to live with others who are similar to them
with respect to ethnic and socioeconomic status. All of this
suggests that we will continue to see significant levels of resi-
dential separation in the residential fabric (26). Although it is a
question of some debate, there is at present no basis for
anticipating evenness to emerge in racial and ethnic spatial
distributions in our cities. Practices of legal, institutional race
exclusion have been substantially dismantled, but stereotypes
and prejudice remain and can promote residential separation in
the absence of housing discrimination. Equally importantly,
people with similar social characteristics often congregate in the
same neighborhoods based on mutual attraction, common in-
terests, and shared sensibilities (27).
Past patterns of coercion and institutional practices such as
race-restricted covenants produced involuntary separation by
severely constraining housing options for minorities. But the
emergence of aff luent African American suburban communities
in contemporary metropolitan areas is not easily explained in
these terms. To the contrary, it is occurring in conjunction with
expanding housing opportunities for middle class minorities and
the rapid demise of exclusively white residential areas. It is
suggestive of the power of positive ethnic association and the
tendency for people to gravitate to the similar, the familiar, and
the comfortable, especially when residing with other groups that
may be indifferent or unwelcoming is not crucial for realizing
other important residential outcomes (e.g., good schools, low
crime, etc.). It further suggests that separation in the residential
mosaic may diminish only slowly even as overt discrimination in
housing declines and expressions of ‘‘racial tolerance’’ increase.
The implication of much commentary on urban areas is that
the urban fabric would quickly become integrated if discrimi-
nation and other constraints on residential opportunities were
eliminated (28). The preference and social distance work both in
its mathematical and agent-based forms, and the survey results
raise serious questions about this view (29). They suggest that
mere tolerance and the absence of virulent housing discrimina-
tion will not produce integration under prevailing patterns of
ethnic preference, at least, not in the short run. That the
Schelling model has a physical analogue is interesting and
theoretically illuminating is without question, but it is the social
content of the Schelling model that gives it its power and
importance. The implications of the mathematical formulations,
simulation results, and survey evidence on preferences converge
to suggest that we cannot presently expect rapid movement
toward even spatial distributions of ethnic and racial groups and
socioeconomic status groups. In view of this, further attention
should be given to understanding how segregation in our met-
ropolitan areas is shaped by the combination of substantial
socioeconomic inequality within and between groups and social
distance dynamics that reflect the salience of race-ethnicity and
socioeconomic status in residential decisions.
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